Drawing on a dataset suitable for macroeconomic analysis, the paper provides an overview of the magnitudes, purpose and institutional implications of EU-related transfers to and from the new member states. A rough analysis of accounting identities and first-round effects shows that EU funds may have led to a fiscal drag of up to 1 percent of GDP and an additional aggregate demand stimulus of up to 1 percent of GDP during the first years of membership. These effects are likely to increase as additional funding become available under the new financial perspective, pointing to the need to consider policy tradeoffs. JEL Classification Numbers: F42, F53, F35.
I. INTRODUCTION Transfers from the EU are increasingly impacting the economies of the EU's new member states in Central and Eastern Europe (NMS).
1 Widely perceived in the region as "manna from heaven", much attention is currently focused on how to absorb these funds as quickly as possible, so as not to lose them under EU rules. At the same time, injecting up to 4 percent of GDP into economies that are already in a rapid catch-up process will have significant macroeconomic ramifications. Little analysis of these effects in the specific context of the NMS has been carried so far, because of uncertainties about the flows involved, the limited empirical evidence to date and the sometimes complex rules regarding the usage of EU funds. Data available from national and EU sources are, prima facie, not useful for macroeconomic analysis because of differences in accounting conventions and categorization.
This paper is intended as a primer on the macroeconomic implications of EU funds in the NMS. It focuses on EU-related financial flows from and to the NMS, during the first 2 ½ years of membership as well as under the EU's new financial perspective (NFP) for 2007-13. This information is not readily available and depends crucially on each country's projected absorption path. The paper seeks to create a correspondence between the forms in which EU funds data are conventionally presented and the categories necessary to assess their impact on fiscal and external accounts and aggregate demand. It also provides some preliminary back-of-the-envelope estimates of the expected magnitudes. The paper is not intended to offer a full macroeconomic analysis, in particular the implications for growth, employment and the real exchange rate. This more ambitious task, which would require a model-based approach, is left to another paper.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II gives an overview of the size and structure of EU funds available to the NMS. Section III focuses on structural funds, which are the bulk of funds under the NFP. Section IV looks at the fiscal implications. Section V provides estimates of projected actual -as opposed to committed -flows, which are necessary to assess the first-round impact of EU funds on aggregate demand and the balance of payment. Section VI concludes.
II. EU FUNDS AVAILABLE TO THE NMS: AN OVERVIEW
EU funds to the NMS serve three broad purposes: income convergence, agricultural support and development of internal market institutions. This is achieved by a myriad of individual programs, each with their own set of rules and target institutions. Moreover, the classification of these funds has changed under the NFP, making it sometimes difficult to compare commitments before and after 2007. Box 1 provides a mapping of the EU's budget headings from old to new financial perspective. An explanation of the various programs is contained in Appendix I. NMS (e.g., administration) are omitted.
Overall funds committed to the NMS are set to increase under the EU's new financial perspective (Figure 1a) 2 . In nominal terms, all NMS are promised substantially greater allocations under the NFP than what they were granted for 2004-06 (the so-called Copenhagen agreement) and before membership (pre-accession aid). Poland, for example, will replace Spain as the largest recipient of EU structural funds. In GDP terms, increases are not quite so impressive (Figure 1b) , reflecting high projected nominal GDP growth in the NMS 3 . Indeed, EU funds are likely to decline as a percentage of GDP in fast-growing countries like Latvia. At the other end of the spectrum, Hungary and Czech Republic are set to enjoy a steep increase in EU funds relative to GDP, in part due lower medium-term growth assumptions. Differences in country-specific allocations primarily reflect the degree of real income convergence ( Funding is increasingly focused on speeding up income convergence (Figure 3 ). Structural and cohesion funds are intended to foster real convergence and therefore account for a large share of payments in the less wealthy NMS. They are set to increase substantially under the NFP, mainly at the expense of unconditional lump sum budget payments granted in the first years of membership primarily to richer countries such as Slovenia (at the time intended to prevent them from becoming net payers to the EU). The NMS will also experience a gradual increase in direct payments to farmers under the common agricultural policy: starting from 40 percent of the level in old members states in 2007, payments to farmers will be increased by 10 percentage points a year to reach parity with the old members by 2013. As EU members, the NMS also contribute about one percent of GDP to the EU budget. These contributions (called own resources) include gross national product based resources, value added tax based resources, the British rebate 4 , and the EU's traditional revenue sources collected on its behalf by national governments (sugar levies and 75 percent of tariffs on non-EU imports) and are presently capped at 1.24 percent of gross national income. In fact, the NMS' annual payments have been around one percent of GDP in 2005 and 2006 (the first full years of membership) and are expected to remain at that level, also in the recent accession countries Bulgaria and Romania.
III. STRUCTURAL FUNDS
Structural and cohesion funds, the EU's main instrument to increase country's growth potential, are attracting great attention in the NMS. These funds finance investment in physical infrastructure and human resource development (rather than income support) and are therefore designed to permanently increase countries' productive potential and speed up real convergence. Absorption of structural funds picked up only slowly in some countries, pointing to teething problems. There is a concern in some NMS that funds could be de-committed if they are not drawn within the timeframe set by the EU. Data now available for the first 2 ½ years of membership allow some analysis of the pace and problems of absorption. Demand is high and contracting of funds committed under the 2004-06 financial perspective is proceeding swiftly. In most countries, it is likely to be completed by the end of 2006. Slovenia is contracting above EU commitments to ensure utilization of all funds in the event that implementation of some projects slips (Figure 5a ). The bottleneck, however, is the absorption of EU funds: the administrative capacity to control projects, ensure efficient implementation, provide co-financing, and receive EU refunds after submission of proper documentation. Figure 5b shows that actual absorption, as measured by the submission of requests for interim payments, differs greatly between countries. The Czech Republic and Absorbing all structural funds presents an increasingly tall order. Under the so-called n+2 rule, countries need to submit all claims for refunds by end-2008, necessitating an acceleration of past absorption rates if funds are not to be de-committed. The challenge is compounded by the increased allocation under the NFP. An extension of the time permitted between contracting and reimbursement from 2 to 3 years will help, at least until 2011 when the n+3 rule reverts to the present n+2 rule. Figure 6 illustrates this absorption challenge by plotting a trend line of absorption to date (based on 2004-06 actuals) against the cumulative amounts that need to be absorbed so as not to lose funds under the n+2/n+3 rule. Estonia is well on track to meeting this challenge while other countries, especially the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovakia and Poland need to sharply accelerate their absorption over the next two years if they are not to lose funds.
Source: National authorities. . Institutional frameworks for managing EU funds can affect the absorption capacity. General requirements are defined by EU regulations, but countries are free to find their own solutions within this framework. To date, one can identify two distinct models among the NMS:
The Baltic countries centered the management around the Finance Ministry which acts both as paying and managing authority.
Frameworks in the Central European countries are less centralized, with managing and paying authorities assigned to separate institutions (paying authority is always in the Ministry of Finance).
Performance so far provides no conclusive answer on which framework is more efficient. After all, the initial leaders in absorption, Slovenia and Estonia, represent both models. However, there appear to be two general lessons from the NMS' experience: First, initial frameworks were over-regulated, often to prevent misuse of EU funds. Secondly, absorption is helped by a strong central managing authority. Countries have already reacted to this initial experience. For example, Poland in late 2005 created a new ministry of regional development to consolidate the oversight over funds which had previously been located in various ministries and this has greatly speeded up absorption. The Czech Republic, meanwhile, is retaining its disaggregated approach to managing EU funds.
IV. FISCAL IMPLICATIONS
EU-related transfers directly impact countries' fiscal balance. This matters, for two reasons: First, many NMS are struggling to exit from the excessive deficit procedure and aim to meet the Maastricht fiscal criteria for Euro adoption. It is therefore important to identify additional budgetary pressures arising from EU funds 5 . Secondly, EU funds obscure the size and direction of the fiscal stimulus. With data for at least two budget years available, it is now possible to undertake a first ex-post assessment.
Measuring the impact of EU funds on the fiscal accounts is fraught with a number of methodological difficulties. Several problems arise:
• Accounting method: The treatment of EU funds differs greatly between countries, mainly because they do not use the accrual-based ESA95 standard in their national budgets but rather stick to cash-based accounting (Box 2). But it is of course the deficit calculated according to ESA95 rules that ultimately matters for determining a country's compliance with the EU's deficit limits.
• Ultimate user of funds: Under ESA95 rules, only funds that end up with "government units as final beneficiaries" are recorded as an expenditure and offsetting revenue item in the fiscal accounts (Box 2). In practice, funds for agricultural support virtually all go to the private sector, while those for internal policies and cohesion go to the public sector. The status of the ultimate user is the most uncertain for structural funds, even on an ex post basis (these data are generally not easily available): information obtained from some countries suggest that 45 percent of regional development funds (ERDF), 70 percent of social funds (ESF) and 100 percent of community initiative funds end up in the public sector.
• Co-financing: Under EU rules, countries need to cofinance every project from national resources, at rates ranging from 15 percent for cohesion funds to 25-50 percent for structural funds 6 . For structural funds committed under the NFP, this ratio has been reduced to 15 percent. In practice, the cofinancing amount may be larger, depending on national policy preferences. Co-financing can also in principle come from the private sector (such as commercial loans) but for the time being, it overwhelmingly relies on budgetary resources.
• Substituted spending: Member countries are allowed to use EU-funds to substitute national spending for some purposes (e.g., agriculture), but not for others (e.g., structural)-the so-called additionality rules 7 . In practice it is virtually impossible to establish how much a government would have spent on a certain expenditure item if it had not had access to EU funds. Estimates of the fiscal impact of EU funds however, crucially hinge on getting the amount of additionality right. A simplified assumption, used in the paper, is that countries substitute domestic spending to the maximum extent possible under EU rules. Most NMS include all EU transfers above-theline regardless of the ownership of the final beneficiaries. Poland and Czech Republic, included only transfers to government beneficiaries initially, but changed this to include also transfers to non-government beneficiaries in the government accounts.
EU-financed part of projects
Expenditures and revenues are booked simultaneously, even if spending is financed by government borrowing and refunded by the EU with a delay. Thus, EU transfers for project financing are deficit neutral as expenditures have an automatic revenue counterpart.
Expenditures and revenues are booked when they are incurred. This is not deficit neutral in the short-run due to time lags between expenditures and corresponding refunds. In the longer-run, the fiscal impact should be neutral to the extent that expenditures are fully refunded by the EU.
National co-financing of EU supported projects
Co-financing, required for most EU projects, is booked as expenditure. Other things equal (e.g., no decline in other expenses), this deteriorates fiscal balance.
The same treatment as in ESA95; the usual cash/accrual discrepancies related to different timing of commitments and cash spending may apply.
Budget compensation received from the EU
This form of transfer from the EU is booked as budget revenue when it is received. Ceteris paribus, it improves fiscal
The same treatment as in ESA95.
balance.
Contributions to the EU budget
Payments to the EU are recorded at the time of their transfer, implying a negative impact on the fiscal balance. Traditional Own Resources (TOR), custom duties on non-EU imports and sugar levies, are not counted as a contribution because they are treated as the EU's budget direct revenue rather than a transfer from member states.
Booked as expenditure when transferred to the EU and thus deteriorates fiscal balance. Except for Hungary, NMS include TOR in their contributions to the EU.
Advances for EU funds
Advances are a part of structural commitments that is paid upfront to provide liquidity for starting EU-supported projects (advances are not related to project implementation). They are an off-budget item and have no fiscal impact.
Baltic states NMS book advances as revenues which temporarily improves the fiscal balance. CEE countries book advances off-budget.
An example for Lithuania illustrates the issues discussed above. It assumes that there is no expenditure substitution, agricultural funds are fully transferred to non-government beneficiaries, and other transfers end up with non-government entities. shown in Figure 7 , EU-related transfers are-all other things being equal-increasingly creating a drag on fiscal deficits. The exact size depends mainly on the assumed amount of substituted spending, but could be in the range of ½ and 1 ½ percent of GDP. EU funds also obscure the size and direction of the fiscal stimulus. With both budgetary revenues and expenditures containing substantial transactions with a non-domestic entity (the European Commission), the change in the headline fiscal deficit from one year to the other is no longer a good approximation of the demand impact of fiscal policy. As shown in Text Table 2 , payments to and from the EU need to be excluded from both expenditures and revenues. Since net transfers from the EU are increasing in all countries, this generally leads to larger estimates of the fiscal stimulus (or less withdrawal of stimulus) than suggested by the headline balances. The challenge is to make best use of EU funds without complicating fiscal policy. EU funds provide a unique opportunity to increase investment spending and thus to accelerate growth. But, as shown above, they will ceteris paribus contribute to larger deficits-a challenge especially for countries trying to meet the Maastricht fiscal criteria. Even in countries with low deficits or a surplus, EU funds may lead to an unwarranted fiscal stimulus. This is an issue primarily in the Baltics, where economies are already showing signs of overheating.
What can be done to contain the fiscal drag? If countries do not want to permit fiscal loosening, they can use EU-funds to substitute domestic spending to the extent possible under EU rules. Cofinancing would need to be accommodated by reducing spending elsewhere, preferably in current expenditures which are still high in the NMS compared to other emerging market countries. This boils down to a relative increase of capital spending in the budget-after all, the purpose of structural funds. Data for 2003-05 provide little evidence that countries have indeed reduced the share of current spending in order to make room for EU structural funds 9 .
V. BROADER MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
The broader macroeconomic implications of EU-related transfers depend on actual flows to the economy as a whole. The analysis needs to consider all funds involved (not only those passing through the budget discussed above) as well as countries' contributions to the EU. As discussed in the section III, actual flows will depend on countries' absorption rates and, to a lesser extent, market variables that influence certain receipts from the EU (e.g., agricultural support) and contributions to the EU (e.g., VAT share). Data for the first two years of EU membership suggest that all NMS were, as expected, net beneficiaries of EU funds, all be it to very different degrees ( Figure 8 ). The Baltic countries received much larger amounts as percent of GDP than their Central European neighbors (between 1 and 2 percent, as opposed to about ½ percent) reflecting relatively large allocations received in the Copenhagen agreement and, at least in Estonia, early progress in establishing effective institutions to manage absorption. Net transfers from the EU are projected to increase to above 2 percent of GDP per year under the NFP for all NMS except Slovenia. At about 3 ½ percent of GDP, average annual inflows in Romania and Bulgaria are projected to be particularly high, reflecting generous allocations under the NFP and only slightly lower expected absorption rates than in the other NMS 10 .
A. Aggregate Demand
A number of conceptual issues arise when estimating the overall demand impact. Since net drawings from the EU were positive, it is natural to expect that they had a positive demand impact, even if limited in some countries. Measuring this impact is, however, not a straightforward task. Issues that need to be taken into account include:
Advance payments bear no relation with economic activity and need to be excluded from any demand-side estimate. Given the infant stage of project preparation, these monies remained largely unspent in 2004 and rested on government accounts. Poland stands out as it initially used most of these advances to finance its state budget deficit. Only in 2005 were advances used at a larger scale to make payments to the beneficiaries of structural funds.
There are other timing issues: EU refunds are only received after documentation has been submitted to and approved by the European Commission (a process which may require up to six months), so they reflect economic activity from the past. It would therefore be more accurate to capture the demand impact at the time when beneficiaries sign contracts with suppliers or pay their bills rather than when EU refunds are received. But such data are difficult to obtain.
As discussed above, it is unclear whether EU funds are crowding out or augmenting domestic spending. Structural funds have an explicit additionality rule, but it is not easy to verify in practice.
Finally, there are second-round or Keynesian multiplier effects as well as general equilibrium implications that can only be captured in a broader model setting.
As a first cut, the demand effect of EU-related transfers can be estimated in a simplified framework. Such a back-of-the envelope approach entirely disregards the timing and second-round effects issues mentioned above. The demand impact can be defined as:
Where demand (D) depends on transfers from the EU (T), national co-financing (NC), contributions paid (C), and advances received (A). One of the greatest uncertainties is the degree in which EU funds substitute domestic spending that would have taken place anyway.
We capture this by a crowding-out factor (α), a measure of substitution between EU transfers and domestic spending (α=1 if there is no substitution).
The demand effect of EU-related transfers is mostly positive, but the results depend crucially on how much domestic spending is substituted. Figure 9a shows the results of the above formula if one makes the (admittedly heroic) assumption that all NMS followed official additionally guidelines on EU transfers, i.e., expenditures financed with structural, pre-accession, and rural development funds do not replace domestic spending while other EU transfers (e.g., cohesion, common agriculture policy, Schengen) do. Reflecting the different types of EU funds received, the implied values for α range from 0.55 in Hungary to 0.65 in Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia. In the first 2 ½ years of EU membership, the demand impact is estimated to be rather modest (less than ½ percent GDP) in Central Europe, but higher (up to 1 percent of GDP) in the Baltics where EU commitments and (in Estonia) absorption have been high. In the time period covered by the NFP, the demand impact will be larger in most countries (especially in Hungary), as net EU-related inflows are projected to increase. The demand impact is estimated to be particularly large in Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria. For illustration, Figure 9b shows the demand effect if all EU funds are assumed to be additional to domestically-funded spending (α=1). The effects are now much larger, up to 4 percent of GDP under the NFP. As the demand impact of EU funds grows, economic policy may need to adjust. In countries where growth is sluggish, EU funds may provide a welcome boost to economic activity. If, however, the economy is already suffering from signs of overheating, measures to offset the unwarranted demand stimulus generated by EU funds may be in place. In the Baltics, where there is little room for monetary or wage policy, a tightening of non-EU related fiscal spending may be one of the few instruments left.
B. Balance of Payments
Transfers from and to the EU will have profound effects on the balance of payment in the NMS. In the first instance, these flows will need to be recorded either in the capital or the current account, depending on whether they are used for investment purposes or for current expenditures. The accounting is not always precise, as some funds could finance both kinds of spending. Text Table 3 shows a schematic classification of how various sorts of EU funds enter external sector statistics. The ultimate impact on the balance of payments will depend on important second-round effects (e.g., the import propensity of EU-funded projects and real appreciation pressures). Such an analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. EU-related transfers complicate the analysis of external sustainability. As shown in Figure 10 , EU funds have in the first instance primarily led to an increase of inward capital transfers, a trend that is likely to intensify over the next years as the importance of structural and cohesion funds increases. The current account balance is affected to a much lesser extent (at least initially) because contributions to the EU partly offset agricultural and other current transfers from the EU. These non-debt-creating flows call for some caution in assessing the external position of the NMS by using traditional indicators, such as the overall current account deficit. Even if import-intensive projects lead to a deterioration of the current account in the short term, this may be largely funded by capital transfers from the EU, with a low risk of sudden stops. External sustainability will also be affected with the real appreciation associated with substantial foreign-exchange denominated inflows.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
EU-related transfers are set to substantially impact the macroeconomic situation in the NMS. We have only focused on the magnitudes and institutional issues involved, disregarding funds intended positive effects on structural change and economic catch-up in the NMS. But even a rough analysis of accounting identities and the first-round impact shows how EU funds can complicate fiscal policy and demand management. For example, we find that EU-related transfers may have ceteris paribus led to a fiscal drag of ½ -1 percent of GDP and an additional aggregate demand stimulus of up to 1 percent of GDP. These effects are likely to grow substantially under the NFP for 2007-13, which allocates additional EU resources, especially structural funds, to the NMS. The paper highlights how much any such estimate depends on the extent to which EU funds replace existing spending plans by both the private and the public sector.
The use of EU funds involves policy tradeoffs. Policy makers need to square the circle of exploiting the enormous opportunities offered by the access to "free money" from Brussels while at the same time guarding against any destabilizing macroeconomic side-effects. One aspect highlighted in this paper is the need to restructure budgetary spending to make sure that the co-financing needs associated with EU funds do not lead to an unwarranted fiscal expansion. A fuller analysis of the macroeconomic policy implications of EU funds, including monetary policy, would require a model that adequately incorporates second-round effects on both the demand and supply side of the economy.
APPENDIX I. EU FUNDS AVAILABLE TO THE NEW MEMBER STATES (NMS) Agriculture
There are several components of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) available to the new member states (NMS):
• Market measures: purchase of unprocessed food at intervention price and subsidies to non-EU exports;
• Direct payments: payments to farmers based on farm area and type of production; in the NMS these are lower than in the EU 
Cohesion Fund
Cohesion fund: this fund is available to countries with GDP per capita below 90 percent of the EU average. It does not finance programs, but is used to directly support large infrastructure projects in transportation and environment.
Internal policies
NMS receive funding within the existing EU policy priorities mainly for:
• nuclear safety: decommissioning of power plants;
• Schengen: to strengthen control of the EU border and to comply with the Schengen Treaty.
Pre-accession aid
This financial assistance is aimed at facilitating adjustment to full membership including to build absorption capacity for EU funds; as such it is not a part of the 2004-06 package. However, disbursements of remaining pre-accession resources continue also after accession. There were three pre-accession instruments:
• 
Budget compensation
Budget compensation: an unconditional payment from the EU budget agreed at the last stage of the accession negotiations. The main goals were to ensure that new members did not become net contributors, and to improve budget liquidity. In part it was financed directly from the EU budget and in part with resources shifted from structural funds allocated to NMS. This is not a regular EU fund, and the NMS which acceded in 2004 will not receive compensation after 2006; Romania and Bulgaria will receive budget compensation until 2009.
APPENDIX 2. EU FUNDS IN NMS -DATA, SOURCES AND CLASSIFICATION
Information on commitments is mainly based on data published by the European Commission (EC). The information is expressed at constant 2004 prices. Whenever necessary, data were recalculated at 2004 prices using an annual deflator of two percent (i.e., the same deflator as applied by the EC). Commitments are divided into different structural funds based on the priorities set in national programs. In agriculture, the EU's support to production and exports is assumed to remain unchanged from current levels. It practice, it will depend on actual production, exports and market prices. Direct payments, based on farmed area, are assumed to increase gradually to reach the amounts paid to farmers in the EU-15 countries by 2013. Support under internal policies is assumed to remain unchanged, except allocations for nuclear plants decommissioning.
Payments from the EU in 2004-06 are based on actual data from national authorities and information published by the EC. In case of inconsistencies (e.g. in internal policies), the EC data were used on the assumption that some programs managed by the Commission may not be fully reflected in national statistics. Estimates for 2007-15 are based on information received from the authorities and country-specific absorption capacities. Projected absorption rates are relatively high: NMSs are assumed to perform somewhat better than previous entrants to the EU such as Portugal and Spain. Given the uncertain future of the EU's common agricultural policy, it was assumed that there will be no such payments after 2013. Payments are divided between current and capital component using the classification explained in text Table 3 .
Spending is calculated as total payments received from the EU minus advance payments. Advance payments are assumed to be finally settled by 2015. The split between government and non-government beneficiaries reflects estimates based on information received from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. The ratio between public and private beneficiaries calculated for these countries were applied to other NMS and kept constant over time. 253  542  611  724  779  812  885  948  1010  1067  Market measures  50  120  123  68  68  68  68  68  68  68  Direct payments  0  186  226  279  345  389  457  523  586  646  Rural development  204  235  262  377  366  355  359  358  356 Structural actions  32  85  314  548  1198  1608  2077  2000  2196  2352  2341  2638  Structural funds  0  12  141  320  630  806  962  985  1102  1180  1170  1193  o/w ERDF  0  11  107  162  364  547  657  657  739  794  821  821  ESF  0  1  34  109  217  209  256  279  314  337  349  372  Community initiatives  0  0  0  49  49  49  49  50  50  50  0  0  Cohesion Funds  32  73  173  227  568  803  1115  1015  1093  1172  1172 1445 3 . I n t e r n a l P o l i c i e s 2 7 1 1 3 6 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 0 0 E x i s t i n g p o l i c i e s 2 7 1 1 3 6 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 0 0 N u c l e a r s a f e t y TOTAL  142  462  698  747  1185  1481  1741  1841  2045  2182  1481  1491 Source: European Commission, national authorities, IMF staff estimates. TOTAL  193  235  365  442  545  565  593  626  664  701  599  324   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  Current payments  141  142  170  156  210  206  230  245  262  272  165 88 M a r k e t m e a s u r e s 0 6 9 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 0 0 D i r e c t p a y m e n t s 0 2 1 2 4 2 7 3 4 4 1 4 8 5 5 6 2 6 8 0 0 E A G G F ( g u a r a n t e e e ) / E A F R D 1 5 4 8 5 3 4 9 7 3 7 3 8 3 9 0 9 7 9 7 9 0 4 2 F I F G / E F F TOTAL  37  113  170  142  219  272  326  344  367  384  293  299 Source: European Commission, national authorities, IMF staff estimates. TOTAL  707  1305  1569  2422  3400  4096  4245  4459  4750  5089  3751  2171   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  Current payments  510  1014  983  1191  1371  1522  1728  1860  2008  2157  775  424  Market measures  3  194  159  168  168  168  168  168  168  168  0  0  Direct payments  0  309  371  399  498  598  698  797  897  997  0  0  EAGGF (guaranteee)/EAFRD  61  169  176  249  238  236  269  292  314  314  292  135  F I F G / E F F  0  0  0  4  5  3  4  4  4  4  4  2  ESF  44  47  72  189  306  351  415  415  431  463  479  287  Community initiatives  0  0  0  48  49  49  49  49  49  50  0  0  Existing policies  37  46  45  108  108  117  126  135  144 31  42  132  126  120  119  136  148  159  159  148  68  ERDF  124  157  269  648  969  1355  1468  1468  1524  1637  1693  960  Cohesion Funds  42  93  184  457  940  1100  913  984  1060  1136  1136 64  696  837  826  961  1124  1275  1408  1542  1642  443  443  Market measures  3  194  159  168  168  168  168  168  168  168  0  0  Direct payments  0  309  371  399  498  598  698  797  897  997  0  0  Rural development  61  193  308  259  294  358  409  443  477  477  443  443  o/w EAGGF (guidance)/EAFRD  0  23  132  256  290  355  406  439  473  473 439 439 E A G G F ( g u a r a n t e e e ) / E A F R D 6 1 1 6 9 1 7 6 0 0 0 Structural actions  42  145  356  594  1254  1555  1913  1984  2097  2246  2233  2659  Structural funds  0  52  171  326  617  758  1000  1000  1037  1110  1097  1145  o/w ERDF  0  38  121  190  372  508  660  660  686  737  762  787  ESF  0  14  50  88  196  201  291  291  302  324  335  358  Community initiatives  0  0  0  48  49  49  49  49  49  50  0  0  Cohesion Funds  42  93  184  267  637  797  913  984  1060  1136  1136  1514  3. Internal Policies  92  100  98  108  108  117  126  135  144  162  0  0  Existing policies  37  46  45  108  108  117  126  135  144 -accession assistance  94  108  53  18  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  TOTAL  398  386  536  720  1362  1672  2039  2119  2241  2408  2233  2659   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  1. Agriculture  64  696  837  826  961  1124  1275  1408  1542  1642  443  443  Market measures  3  194  159  168  168  168  168  168  168  168  0  0  Direct payments  0  309  371  399  498  598  698  797  897  997  0  0  Rural development  61  193  308  259  294  358  409  443  477  477  443 0  52  170  270  539  707  932  932  968  1039  1075  1116  Structural funds  0  52  170  270  539  707  932  932  968  1039  1075  1116  o/w ERDF  0  46  148  232  455  621  807  807  838  900  931  962  ESF  0  6  22  38  84  86  125  125  129  139  144  153  Community TOTAL  110  801  1033  1104  1500  1831  2206  2340  2510  2681  1518  1559 Source: European Commission, national authorities, IMF staff estimates. Structural actions  52  129  233  454  529  485  489  531  561  600  605  347  Structural funds  52  50  88  244  303  300  325  354  370  396  401  218  o/w ERDF  38  35  54  174  235  240  262  284  295  317  328 . I n t e r n a l P o l i c i e s 3 7 2 6 5 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 0 0 E x i s t i n g p o l i c i e s 3 7 2 6 3 1 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 0 0 N u c l e a r s a f e t y . I n t e r n a l P o l i c i e s 3 7 2 6 5 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 0 0 E x i s t i n g p o l i c i e s 3 7 2 6 3 1 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 0 0 N u c l e a r s a f e t y TOTAL  67  178  226  185  286  282  346  379  406  429  322  323 Source: European Commission, national authorities, IMF staff estimates. TOTAL  477  631  704  1068  1322  1509  1378  1413  1537  1623  1246  728   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  Current payments  388  461  508  486  510  525  584  635  691  727  337 175 M a r k e t m e a s u r e s 1 4 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 0 0 Direct payments  0  80  93  106  132  159  185  211  238  264  0  0  EAGGF (guaranteee)/EAFRD  49  135  171  135  153  140  160  173  187  187  173  80  FIFG/EFF  1  4  1  13  18  16  18  19  21  21  19  9  ESF  18  11  12  71  94  96  106  115  129  139  144  86  Community initiatives  1  7  1  11  13  14  14  14  15 1 2  7  3 7  2 2  2 5  2 3  2 6  2 8  3 0  3 0  2 8  1 3  ERDF  59  78  70  261  341  365  365  365  411  442  457  244  Cohesion Funds  18  81  80  199  346  368  275  257  277  297  297  168  Nuclear safety  0  4  9  101  101  228  128  128  128  128  128 Structural actions  19  108  120  287  499  493  528  517  568  608  603  689  Structural funds  1  27  40  137  232  205  253  259  291  311  306  313  o/w ERDF  0  20  31  90  154  137  164  164  185  199  206  206  ESF  0  0  8  36  66  54  74  81  91  97  101  107  Community initiatives  1  7  1  11  13  14  14  14  15  15  0  0  Cohesion Funds  18  81  80  150  266  288  275  257  277  297  297  376  3. Internal Policies  114  143  145  136  136  264  163  163  163  163  128 0  80  93  106  132  159  185  211  238  264  0  0  Rural development  49  139  210  110  157  178  204  221  238  238  221 Structural actions  0  24  42  125  216  191  233  236  265  285  294  297  Structural funds  0  24  42  125  216  191  233  236  265  285  294  297  o/w ERDF  0  24  38  110  188  168  201  201  226  243  251  251  ESF  0  0  3  15  28  23  32  35  39  42  43 TOTAL  104  299  417  423  571  593  687  733  806  852  515  518 Source: European Commission, national authorities, IMF staff estimates. TOTAL  2736  3868  4705  7845  10689  11023  11187  11358  12491  13300  10555  5602   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  Current payments  1846  3085  3267  3562  4169  4012  4377  4780  5228  5530  2654  1410  Market measures  11  174  221  230  230  230  230  230  230  230  0  0  Direct payments  0  689  782  852  1064  1277  1490  1703  1916  2129  0  0  EAGGF (guaranteee)/EAFRD  287  649  1004  978  1215  992  1134  1229  1323  1323  1229  567  FIFG/EFF  20  32  51  113  97  69  79  86  92  92  86  40  ESF  204  171  359  816  1063  982  982  1072  1206  1295  1340  804  Community initiatives  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  Existing policies  0  10  23  461  461  461  461  461  461 Structural actions  273  313  1044  2356  4340  4210  5160  4966  5464  5862  5963  6709  Structural funds  0  89  586  1278  2213  1962  2366  2429  2733  2935  3036  3099  o/w ERDF  0  55  335  832  1427  1399  1679  1679  1889  2029  2099  2099  ESF  0  34  251  446  785  563  688  750  844  906  938  1000  Community initiatives  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  Cohesion Funds  273  225  458  1078  2128  2248  2793  2537  2732  2927  2927  3610  3. Internal Policies  103  111  123  461  461  461  461  461  461  461  0  0  Existing policies  0  10  23  461  461  461  461  461  461 TOTAL  1359  1468  1831  2893  4827  4671  5621  5427  5926  6323  5963  6709   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  1. Agriculture  297  1594  2295  1982  2699  2820  3220  3558  3896  4109  1625  1625  Market measures  11  174  221  230  230  230  230  230  230  230  0  0  Direct payments  0  689  782  852  1064  1277  1490  1703  1916  2129  0  0  Rural development  287  732  1291  901  1405  1312  1500  1625  1750  1750  1625 TOTAL  536  1891  2874  3227  4793  4771  5567  5931  6566  6976  4592  4618 Source: European Commission, national authorities, IMF staff estimates. 0  1  2  1  1  2  2  2  2  1  ESF  35  41  84  131  165  159  159  159  179  193  199  133  Community initiatives  0  0  0  29  29  28  29  29  29 Capital payments  85  112  232  620  1038  1184  1137  1183  1300  1388  1410  896  EAGGF (guidance)/EAFRD  18  30  32  37  52  41  46  50  54  54  50  23  ERDF  64  40  84  326  513  581  581  634  713  766  793  528  Cohesion Funds  2  42  82  224  439  509  456  445  479  514  514  291  Nuclear safety  0  0  33  33  33  54  54  54  54  54  54 Structural actions  2  57  178  340  664  707  858  871  955  1023  1010  1213  Structural funds  0  15  97  201  362  335  402  426  475  509  496  562  o/w ERDF  0  1  38  99  206  214  262  285  321  345  357  404  ESF  0  14  59  73  127  93  112  112  126  135  139  158  Community initiatives  0  0  0  29  29  28  29  29  29  30  0  0  Cohesion Funds  2  42  82  139  302  372  456  445  479  514  514  651  3. Internal Policies  34  50  82  113  113  133  133  133  133  133  54 TOTAL  79  296  395  414  692  696  816  891  986  1047  725  791 Source: European Commission, national authorities, IMF staff estimates. 21  78  92  60  87  80  92  99  107  107  99  46  F I F G / E F F  0  0  0  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  1  ESF  8  12  24  46  55  78  88  88  91  98  101 TOTAL  38  141  184  141  203  277  335  353  376  397  288  294 Source: European Commission, national authorities, IMF staff estimates.
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